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I.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A.

ISSUE

You have asked that we assist the PILPG High Level Working Group ("PILPG")
on various piracy issues to provide assistance to the Kenya Piracy Court and other
cooperating state courts and to help to lay the groundwork for a United Nations Security
Council-created Regional Piracy Court ("International Piracy Court" or "IPC"). 1
We have been asked to provide our opinion with respect to the following
question:
In what ways should provisions and agreements governing surrender and legal
assistance of a Security Council-created Piracy Court differ from a War Crimes
Tribunal?
B.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION

In general, the surrender and legal assistance regime of the IPC should follow that
of the International Criminal Court ("ICC"), with its principal of complementarity. The
ICC surrender and legal assistance model was built on the experience of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia ("ICTY") and the International Criminal Tribunal of
Rwanda ("ICTR") and addressed criticisms levied against the ICTY and ICTR,
particularly in the areas of respect for state sovereignty and protection of the individual
rights of the accused. While the ICC surrender and legal assistance regime is arguably

1

Memorandum to Angela Vigil, Baker & McKenzie, from Brett Ashley Edwards, PILPG dated March 7,
2011.
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weaker than that of the ICTY and ICTR 2 , the IPC will likely more closely resemble the
ICC, which is intended to be a permanent court addressing ongoing violations, rather than
an ad hoc criminal tribunal with a limited mandate to address specific crimes occurring
during a definite period of time in a specific jurisdiction. Furthermore, like the ICC, the
IPC is intended to address "situations where national courts are unwilling or unable to
prosecute perpetrators" and the legal assistance provisions of the IPC should not
constrain, but rather encourage, prosecutions of piracy by national courts. 3 However,
procedures addressing the issuance of warrants and requests for surrender for the IPC
must differ from existing provisions for the ICC to address the unique factual situation of
the piracy problem and facilitate surrender of pirates apprehended at sea.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Piracy is the original universal jurisdiction crime. 4 Accordingly, under the

doctrine of universal jurisdiction, any nation can prosecute piracy offenses, even over the
objection of the defendants’ and victims’ home states. In addition, a majority of states
have the obligation to repress piracy under the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea ("UNCLOS"). 5 Yet, despite individual states’ efforts to prosecute pirates, an

2

Göran Sluiter, The Surrender of War Criminals to the International Criminal Court, 25 LOY. L.A. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 605, 650 (2003).
3

Richard Dicker & Elise Keppler, Beyond the Hague: The Challenges of International Justice, Human
Rights Watch World Report 2004, available at http://www.hrw.org/es/node/68116.
4

Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation, 45
HARV. INT'L L.J. 183, 184 (2004), citing United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 223 (N.D. Cal. 1981)
(“[Universal] jurisdiction had its origins in the special problems and characteristics of piracy. It is only in
recent times that nations have begun to extend this type of jurisdiction to other crimes.”).
5

United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea, part XII, art. 100 (Dec. 10, 1982)(“All States shall
cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place
outside the jurisdiction of any State.”), available at

2
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international naval force dedicated to counter piracy operations 6 and an attempt by the
international community to set up a dedicated piracy court in Kenya 7 , hundreds of pirates
and suspected pirates, including many who have been detained while attacking merchant
ships, have been released without trial. 8 Clearly, there is a need for pirates to be tried
before an independent and transparent international judiciary similar to the IPC.
There are, however, two significant obstacles to creating a successful system for
prosecuting pirates stemming from the factual situation of piracy off the Horn of Africa
that must be considered when drafting statutory provisions governing the obligations of
surrender and legal assistance of state parties to the IPC. One problem eviscerating any
court or tribunal’s ability to succeed in the prosecution of piracy in the region of Somalia
is the practice of ‘catch and release’ of pirates. The other is the lack of an effective
government as well as strong judicial and correctional instututions.
Catch and release arises because arresting bodies are either unwilling or unable to
accept suspected pirates or because jurisdictions are not prepared to prosecute them.
Many suspected pirates have been transferred to the judicial authorities and were being

http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm (last accessed July 27,
2011).
6

Combined Marine Forces Public Affairs, New Counter-Piracy task Force Established, NAVY.MIL, Jan. 8,
2009, http://www.navy.mil/search/print.asp?story_id=41687 (last visited July 27,2011).

7

Mombasa’s fast-track piracy court set up in June 24th was effectively disarmed when the high court of
Mombasa ruled Kenya did not have jurisdiction outside of its national waters. Julia Zebley, Kenya court
rules no jurisdiction over international piracy cases, Jurist (November 09, 2010, 2:31 p.m. ET),
http://jurist.org/paperchase/2010/11/kenya-court-rules-no-jurisdiction-over-international-piracy-cases.php .

8

Security Council Press Release 10164, January 25, 2011,
www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10164.doc.htm; LAUREN PLOCH ET AL., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, PIRACY OFF THE HORN OF AFRICA 27 (2011), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40528.pdf; IMO, Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against
Ships, Annual Report 2009, Ref. T2-MSS/2.11.4.1; MSC.4/Circ.152 (29 March 2010) at annex 2 (Statistics
on recent attacks).

3
CHIDMS1/2912348.4

detained in 13 countries. 9 However, as of May 2010, more than 9 out of 10 captured
pirates have not been prosecuted. 10 It seems that the prosecution of pirates became an
exception rather than a rule. For example, the European Union Naval Force Somalia
recently released two pirate suspects to Somalia because of "insufficient evidence to
secure a prosecution." 11 In the United Kingdom, the Royal Navy is "regularly allowing
Somalian pirates to go free because of the risk they would claim asylum if prosecuted in
Europe." 12 From mid-August to mid-December 2010, the command of the Atalanta force
captured 51 pirates who were immediately freed. 13 An IPC that effectively and
comprehensively addresses piracy would seek to suppress the number of state catch and
releases through successful prosecution with the aid of participating states.
To avoid the practice of 'catch and release' and prosecute piracy suspects
effectively, there has to be a strong and efficient government in place that is capable to
provide a solid body of legislation and judicial authorities for the prosecution process. It
is difficult to conclude anything other than that Somalia is a "failed state." Since the
overthrow of the government of Siad Barre in 1991, a lack of rule of law and ineffective
governance has had a "profound negative impact on the population." 14 The United

9

Security Council Report S/2011/30 at 20 (January 25, 2011).

10

Id.

11

Official Website of the European Union Naval Force Somalia, EU NAVFOR Warship Disrupts Suspected
Pirate Whaler, April 4, 2011 http://www.eunavfor.eu/2011/04/eu-navfor-warship-disrupts-suspectedpirate-whaler/ (last visited July 28, 2011).
12

Nick Britten, Navy Regularly Releases Somali Pirates, Even When Caught in the Act, November 29,
2009, The Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/piracy/6684210/Navy-regularlyreleases-Somali-pirates-even-when-caught-in-the-act.html (last visited July 28, 2011).
13

Agence France-Presse press release, December 29, 2010.

14

Report to UN Secretary General on possible options to prosecute and imprison pirates at 8, , S/2010/394
(26 July 2010).
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Nations agencies working in Somalia report that prosecution courts in Somalia remain
extremely weak, and on land, only UNDP and other UN agencies are helping "to
strengthen the prevention, detecting and prosecution of gangs involved in piracy." 15
Moreover, Somalia is a member of the Islamic Courts Union, a group of Sharia courts
who united to oppose the administration of the Somali government, partly to consolidate
resources and power and partly to aid in handing down decisions across, rather than
within, clan lines. 16 The Islamic Courts Union mainly consisting of Islamic militias is
now seen by many Somalia's citizens as the provider of daily services in a continually
unstable country. 17 However, some U.S. officials claim Somali Islamists could be
harboring terrorists. 18 As a result, law enforcement in Somalia is mainly provided by
militia groups acting as police and judiciary. Such minimum level of law and order
translates into a lack of rule of law in Somalia and an insecure environment making a
domestic judicial system very weak and unstable.
The lack of correctional capacities in Somalia is also an obstacle to prosecuting
pirates. The burden on the prison system, with sentences that can be as high as 20 to 30
years or even life imprisonment, discourages Somalia from initiating the prosecution of
pirates who have not been apprehended in its territorial waters. 19 Moreover, according to
a United Nations Development Program study, less than 5% of the 76 judges and 6

15

United Nations in Somalia, http://www.unctsom.org/how_we_work.html (July 27, 2011).

16

PBS NewsHour, Islamist Control of Mogadishu Raises Concern of Extremist Future for Somalia, June 8,
2006, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/africa/jan-june06/somalia_06-08.html (last visited July 28,
2011).
17

Id.

18

Id.

19

Security Council Report, S/2011/30 at 36 (January 25, 2011).
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prosecutors in the region have had legal training, and, due to such ignorance, the judges
apply customary law, including Sharia law, instead of applicable statutory law. 20 Finally,
due to the poor judicial system, pirate leaders currently have more power than the
beleaguered Somali government. 21 Pirate gangs operating along Somalia's 1,900-milelong coastline have become "increasingly audacious over the past two years, hijacking
dozens of merchant ships and their crews to earn ransoms that can top $1 million per
ship." 22 The pirate leaders were also able to establish the world's first pirate stock
exchange in Somalia that is "open 24 hours a day and allows investors to profit from
ransoms collected on the high seas, which can approach $10 million for successful
attacks against Western commercial vessels." 23 As a result, due to the weak court system
and political institutions, the Somalian government is currently not capable to lower the
influence of militia groups and pirate leaders.
The abovementioned factual circumstances show that a specialized international
piracy tribunal is required. An IPC would be politically and legally justifiable, since an
independent court would strengthen the rule of law in Somalia and other countries in the
region as well as contribute to the potential cooperation of states with each other. An IPC
and its fledged legislative framework would be crucial for strenghthening the cooperation
among states and prevention of inconsistent handling of pirates.

20

Security Council Report, S/2011/30 at 38 (January 25, 2011).

21

JSL Times, Somali Pirates Release UAE-Owned Oil Tanker, July 28, 2011,
http://www.jsltimes.com/somali-pirates-release-uae-owned-oil-tanker (last visited July 28, 2011).
22

Id.

23

Avi Jorisch, Today's Pirates Have Their Own Stock Exchange, The Wall Street Journal, June 16, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304520804576341223910765818.html (last visited July
29, 2011).
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III.

LEGAL DISCUSSION
A.

DEFINITIONS

The surrender and legal assistance regime of the IPC will be key to its success
because like any other international organization of international court, the IPC will only
be able to fulfill its mandate if it receives the necessary assistance from cooperating
states. For purposes of this memorandum, "legal assistance" refers to the obligation of a
state to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of persons brought before the IPC.
Thus, the terms legal assistance regime and cooperation regime will be used
interchangeably. "Surrender" refers to the physical transfer of persons to the IPC, and is a
key and contentious aspect of legal assistance since it "deprives individuals of liberty and
exposes them to a foreign criminal justice system." 24
This memorandum borrows the definition of surrender from the understanding of
the use of the term "surrender" in the context of the ICC, ICTY, ICTR and other
international tribunals. The concept of "surrender" was introduced by the ICTY and
ICTR to distinguish the turnover of war criminals to the international tribunals from
"extradition." 25 The difference between extradition and surrender is that extradition
applies to the transfer of persons between states, while surrender applies to the transfer of
a person to an international tribunal. 26 The concept of surrender was introduced in an
effort to prevent existing national extradition laws and international treaties from

24

Sluiter, supra note 1, at 606.

25

Id. at 608.

26

Id. at 607.
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hindering the prosecution of criminals by the international tribunals. 27 The debate over
the use of the term "surrender" during the Rome Statute of the International Court
("Rome Statute" or "ICC Statute") negotiations show that in terms of legal assistance, the
ICTY, ICTR, and the ICC were intended to be superior to the states. 28
B.

JURISDICTION: CONCURRENT V. COMPLEMENTARY

Before statutory provisions governing legal assistance for IPC can be
contemplated, a jurisdictional threshold question must be answered: what will be the
IPC’s relationship with national courts? There are two existing models: (1) the concurrent
jurisdiction with "primacy clause" model of the ICTR and ICTY, and (2) the
complementary jurisdiction model of the ICC. 29 The statutory provisions of the statutes
governing the ICTY and ICTR explicitly state that "[a]t any stage of the proceedings, the
[international tribunal] may require national courts to defer to the competence of the
[international tribunal]." 30 This primacy clause gives these tribunals a priority right to try
cases that fall under their subject matter jurisdiction over a national court that has
concurrent jurisdiction. Because the experience of the ICTY and ICTR gave rise to
criticism from states that felt their sovereignty was being eroded, the ICC Statute was
drafted with much more deference to its state parties’ national courts.

27

Id. at 608 (“[T]he ICTY and ICTR statutes and rules consistently avoid the term ‘extradition,’ and
instead use the word ‘transfer’ or surrender’”).

28

Id.

29

Oscar Solera, Complementary jurisdiction and international criminal justice, INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF
vol. 84, no. 845 at 147-48 (March 2002), available at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/145-172-solera.pdf.

THE RED CROSS,
30

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 8, as amended and adopted Jan. 31, 2010
[hereinafter ICTR Statute]; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 8,
as amended July 7, 2009 [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
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Under the ICC model of complementary jurisdiction, the ICC is competent to try
a case that falls under its subject matter jurisdiction unless a state claims jurisdiction.
However, national courts are not granted absolute priority. The ICC is permitted to
reclaim jurisdiction if the prosecuting state is either "unwilling or unable to genuinely
carry out the investigation or prosecution." 31 This model of jurisdiction expresses the
intention for the ICC to be a court of last resort, meaning it will not take a case that is
being investigated or prosecuted by a state, but it may take a case if the state is unwilling
or unable to genuinely carry out the prosecution. The ICC is "designed to operate where
there is no prospect of international criminals being duly tried in domestic courts." 32
The IPC should function more similarly to the ICC, as opposed to the ICTY or
other criminal tribunals for several reasons. First, the IPC should function as a court of
last resort. Uniquely, piracy has long been established as a universal jurisdiction crime,
and as a matter of international law, any state has the ability to prosecute pirates. The
establishment of the IPC should not diminish individual state’s obligations to prosecute
pirates. Piracy is a worldwide problem that affects all mankind. Under the ICC model, the
obligation to prosecute pirates remains an international obligation for all states. 33
Further, the ICC’s complementary jurisdiction model, which gives deference to
national courts, better respects traditional notions of state sovereignty. This is important
because the experience of creating the ICC shows that states perceive their relationship
with a permanent international criminal court as different from that to an ad hoc tribunal

31

Rome Statute, art. 17(1)(a)-(b).

32

Solera, supra note 29, at 148.

33

Id. at 158.
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with more limited geographic and temporal jurisdiction. 34 The IPC will likely more
closely resemble the ICC in its lack of durational or regional boundaries. The ICC model
will be less controversial and more likely to garner support from the international
community.
Finally, the ICC model of complementary jurisdiction is best suited to respond to
the piracy problem because it encourages cooperation from individual states. For
example, Germany is currently prosecuting Ignace Murwanashyaka and Straton Musoni
for their roles in ordering mass murder and rape in the Congo under the doctrine of
universal jurisdiction. 35 Meanwhile, a third suspect, Callixte Mbarushimana, who was
living in France, was not brought to trial domestically in France but has been extradited
to the ICC for prosecution. "This co-operative burden-sharing in prosecuting individuals
for serious international crimes will greatly advance the fight against impunity," said UN
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in January.36 The IPC should not hinder prosecution of
pirates by individual states who wish to do so, especially since the IPC is largely being
established to fill a gap left by the non-prosecution of pirates by individual states.
Moreover, given the fact that the IPC will have limited resources, the IPC’s ability to
encourage states to deal with piracy in their own national courts will be central to its
ability to succeed in its mission of suppressing the piracy problem.

34

Solera, supra note 29, at 149.

35

Rwanda: Ignace Murwanashyaka and Straton Musoni tried. (May 4, 2011, 12:59 ET)
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13275795).
36

Id.
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C.

PROPOSED STATUTORY PROVISIONS

To clearly articulate our recommendations as to what statutory provisions should
govern surrender and legal assistance for the IPC, this section provides draft statutory
language addressing each issue. Note that these provisions are only intended to serve as a
starting point for further drafting. The language for these proposed provisions has been
adopted directly from international agreements and the statutes and rules of procedure
and evidence of existing war crimes tribunals and international courts and crafted to fit
the objectives of an IPC. In drafting these provisions, we have reviewed the relevant
statues, as well as, rules of procedure and evidence of the ICC, ICTY, ICTR, the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, the Special Court for Sierra Leone
and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. In addition we have borrowed certain provisions
from the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence Against the
Safety of Marine Navigation ("SUA Convention"). Although there are many differences
between governing statutes among international tribunals and courts, commonalities
arising from a comparative analysis of these tribunals provide a comprehensive drafting
framework for an IPC. The following provisions could govern surrender and legal
assistance of the IPC:
1.

Jurisdiction

Article 1

Jurisdiction

(1) The International Piracy Court and national courts of all state parties
shall have original and concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute persons for
violations of international piracy law committed on the high seas and in
coastal waters.
(2) The jurisdiction of the International Piracy Court shall be
complementary to national courts. At any stage of the proceedings, the
International Piracy Court may formally require national courts to defer
to the competence of the International Piracy Court in accordance with
11
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Article 2 of the present Statute and the rules of procedure and evidence of
the International Piracy Court. States Parties shall, in accordance with
the provisions of this statute, comply with requests for arrest and
surrender.
Article 2

Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction

(1) A State that becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the
jurisdiction of the International Piracy Court with respect to the crimes
referred to in (definitions).
(2) This court shall defer jurisdiction to national courts exercising universal
jurisdiction so long as that court:
(a) is willing to exercise jurisdiction and
(b) is determined to be competent to exercise jurisdiction by the
International Piracy Court.
Articles 1 and 2 describe the jurisdictional model of the court. As discussed in
Section III. B. above, the IPC, like the ICC, should take a complementary role to national
courts in order to respect the sovereignty of the individual states as well as take
advantage of the established universal nature of the crime of piracy. Article 2(2) will
allow the IPC to exercise jurisdiction in cases of non-prosecution in states ill-equipped
for prosecution such as Somalia and in cases where the international community feels a
certain jurisdiction is unwilling or unable to fairly or adequately prosecute pirates, such
as in certain regions of Somalia where piracy ringleaders may be affiliated with and
protected by state authorities. 37

37

See Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1853 (2008),
S/2010/91, at 7 (“Several candidates in the leadership contest of January 2009, which saw
Abdirahman Faroole accede to the Puntland presidency, accepted significant campaign contributions
from pirate leaders. Several notorious pirate leaders remain at liberty in Puntland, and senior officials
have at times intervened to secure the liberty of kinsmen detained during the course of counterpiracy operations.”).
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2.

Duty to Arrest

Article 3

Duty of Arrest

(1) Any State Party upon being satisfied that the circumstances so
warrant, in accordance with its law and this statute, shall take persons
suspected of piracy into custody or take other measures to ensure
such persons’ presence for such time as is necessary to enable any
criminal or extradition proceedings to be instituted.
(2) The State Party conducting the arrest shall immediately make a
preliminary inquiry into the facts, in accordance with its own
legislation and this statute.
(3) Any person regarding whom the measures referred to in paragraph 1
are being taken shall be entitled to:
(a) communicate without delay with the nearest appropriate
representative of the State of which he is a national or which is
otherwise entitled to establish such communication or, if he is a
stateless person, the State in the territory of which he has his
habitual residence;
(b) be visited by a representative of that State.
To combat the catch and release of pirates, the statute of the IPC should make the
arrest of pirates an obligation. Those making the arrest are in the best position to make an
initial inquiry. This initial inquiry will ensure efficient prosecution along with the
efficient use of other resources of the court. However, such arrest and preliminary inquiry
should not contravene international norms of due process. The consular rights provisions
proposed here are borrowed from the SUA Convention. 38 The statutory language of
Article 3 is also modeled on that of the SUA Convention because it provides a
comprehensive and employable model for which states can be held accountable. 39

38

UN Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, art. 7,
sect 3 (1)-3 (2) (March 10, 1988). http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/aptmaritime.pdf
39

Id. at art. 7(3)(1)
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3.
Article 4

Notice of Arrest
Duty to provide notice of arrest

When a State Party, pursuant to this article, has taken a person into custody,
it shall immediately notify the [secretary general] of the International Piracy
Court along with any interested States, of the fact that such person is in
custody and of the circumstances which warrant his detention. The State
which makes the preliminary inquiry contemplated in paragraph 2 of Article
3 shall promptly report its findings to the said States along with this court
and shall indicate whether it intends to exercise jurisdiction to prosecute.
The IPC's model of complementary jurisdiction makes it a court of last resort. So
long as a State is deemed willing and competent to prosecute a suspected pirate the Court
will defer to that State’s jurisdiction. However, in order to make that finding of
willingness and competence the Court must be made aware of the arrest. Other interested
states must also be made aware of the arrest, because they may wish to exercise their
universal jurisdiction over the suspected pirate if the arresting state does not wish to do
so. The language for this provision is modeled after Article 7(5) of the SUA
Convention. 40
4.
Article 5

Cooperation and Judicial Assistance
Cooperation and judicial assistance

(1) If prosecution is so warranted and the arresting state is unable or
unwilling to prosecute, the arresting state shall
(a) cooperate with the International Piracy Court in the investigation and
prosecution of persons accused of committing violations of
international piracy law or
(b) cooperate with such other State Parties as have indicated the intent to
exercise jurisdiction in the investigation and prosecution of persons
accused of committing violations of international piracy law.

40

Id. at Art. 7(5).
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(2) State Parties shall comply without undue delay with any request for
assistance or an order issued by the International Piracy Court,
including, but not limited to:
(a) the identification and location of persons;
(b) the taking of testimony and the production of evidence;
(c) the service of documents;
(d) the arrest or detention of persons;
(e) the surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International
Piracy Court or other state exercising jurisdiction.
(3) The International Piracy Court may, upon request, cooperate with and
provide assistance to a State Party conducting an investigation into or
trial in respect of conduct which constitutes piracy as defined in the
Statute of the International Piracy Court.
Article 5 articulates specific types of assistance states are obligated to provide to
the court. Some of this assistance will already be covered during the preliminary inquiry
under Article 3(2); however, the assistance state parties are obligated to provide is not
limited to the preliminary inquiry, and cooperation with the court is continuous. These
provisions are similar to those currently used by the ICTY and ICTR. Both international
criminal tribunals currently call upon states to assist in surrender of suspected criminals,
as well as to cooperate with the International Criminal Police Organization. 41
Article 5(c) is based on Article 93(1) if the ICC Statute and authorizes the IPC to
cooperate with and provide assistance to state parties prosecuting crimes under the
jurisdiction of the IPC. 42 This provision should be included to emphasize the cooperative
and complementary nature of the IPC in relation to national courts.

41

See ICTY Statute, art. 29.

42

Sluiter, supra note 2, at 613.
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5.
Article 6

Requests for Cooperation
Requests for cooperation: general provisions

(1)
(a) The Court shall have the authority to make requests to States Parties
for cooperation. The requests shall be transmitted through the
diplomatic channel or any other appropriate channel as may be
designated by each State Party upon ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession. Subsequent changes to the designation shall be
made by each State Party in accordance with the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence.
(b) When appropriate, without prejudice to the provisions of
subparagraph (a), requests may also be transmitted through the
International Criminal Police Organization or any appropriate
regional organization.
(2) Requests for cooperation and any documents supporting the request shall
either be in or be accompanied by a translation into an official language
of the requested State or one of the working languages of the Court, in
accordance with the choice made by that State upon ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession.
Subsequent changes to this choice shall be made in accordance with the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
(3) The requested State shall keep confidential a request for cooperation and
any documents supporting the request, except to the extent that the
disclosure is necessary for execution of the request.
(4) In relation to any request for assistance presented under this Part, the
Court may take such measures, including measures related to the
protection of information, as may be necessary to ensure the safety or
physical or psychological well-being of any victims, potential witnesses
and their families. The Court may request that any information that is
made available under this Part shall be provided and handled in
a manner that protects the safety and physical or psychological well-being
of any victims, potential witnesses and their families.
(5)
(a) The Court may invite any State not party to this Statute to provide
assistance under this Part on the basis of an ad hoc arrangement, an
agreement with such State or any other appropriate basis.
(b) Where a State not party to this Statute, which has entered into an ad
hoc arrangement or an agreement with the Court, fails to cooperate
with requests pursuant to any such arrangement or agreement, the
Court may so inform the Assembly of States Parties or the Security
Council.
16
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(6) The Court may ask any intergovernmental organization to provide
information or documents. The Court may also ask for other forms of
cooperation and assistance which may be agreed upon with such an
organization and which are in accordance with its competence or
mandate.
(7) Where a State Party fails to comply with a request to cooperate by the
Court contrary to the provisions of this Statute, thereby preventing the
Court from exercising its functions and powers under this Statute, the
Court may make a finding to that effect and refer the matter to the
Assembly of States Parties or to the Security Council.
Article 6 is procedural and puts forth steps to request cooperation from states. The
language presented here is based on Article 87 of the ICC Statute. These steps are
included to ensure efficiency, fairness, and safety. One criticism to the ICC Statute is that
it is weak on enforcement. However, Article 6(7) leaves open the possibility for various
sanctions by the Security Council. These possibilities include fines and loss of vote in the
General Assembly. 43 The ICTY and ICTR Statutes are even more vague on the subject of
sanctions, and only provide for a right to notify the Security Council of failure to
cooperate.
It would be ideal to incorporate more specific provisions regarding sanctions and
enforcement of cooperation obligations to the IPC statute in order to ensure state
cooperation due to the unique economic and social role piracy currently plays in volatile
proposed member states such as Somalia. However, due to the lack of strong institutions,
it would be difficult to implement these sanctions in a failed state such as Somalia. It is
worth noting, however, that even if no specific sanctions will be drafted in the IPC
statute, the member states will still be subject to the UN Security Council's sanctions due
to the nature of the IPC created by the Security Council. Since member states will adhere
43

See ICC Statute, supra note 1, at 82–83.
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to the IPC statute, it will be binding on all member states. Moreover, even if viewed in
the light of the general principles of international law, the authority of the UN Security
Council is derived from the UN Charter and, by virtue of Article 25 of the UN Charter,
all decisions made by the UN Security Council are binding upon all UN member states. 44
As a result, the UN Security Council can refer to the IPC a criminal piracy case and ask
all UN member states to cooperate in the IPC's investigation process. Moreover, if the
UN Security Council adopts a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter ("Action
with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression"), it
is binding on all UN member states. 45 All states must then comply, and all states will
have obligations to cooperate.
6.
Article 7

Availability of Domestic Procedures
Availability of procedures under national law

States Parties shall ensure that there are procedures available under their
national law for all of the forms of cooperation, which are specified under
this statute.
In order to ensure cooperation member states need to take steps domestically to
facilitate the smooth functioning of the IPC. 46 Indeed, in 2010 the Security Council
unanimously adopted Resolution 1918 calling on all states to criminalize piracy. Certain
states, such as the United States, if it becomes a state party or enters into an ad hoc

44

U.N. Charter, art. 25.

45

U.N. Charter, Ch. VII.

46

Language based upon Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/Conf/87/9),
available at, http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm (accessed 6/27/11).
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cooperation agreement with the IPC, may need to pass implementing domestic legislation
before they may comply with their obligations to the IPC.
D.

UNRESOLVED ISSUES

The pirates on the high seas, although the most visible pirate in the media, are the
lowest level of an intricate organized crime structure that reaches all the way to
government officials. 47 As discussed above in Section II Factual Background, we assume
that the IPC may be called on to prosecute, not only the persons physically engaged in
attacking ships at sea, but also the criminal masterminds and ringleaders of piracy
operations. The draft provisions we have put forth in this memo, which attempt to
specifically address trying persons captured at sea, admittedly fall short of providing a
comprehensive solution because they fail to solve the problems associated with
discovering, extraditing and gathering evidence against the land-based pirate leaders,
organizers and financiers. Obtaining surrender of persons to the IPC and legal assistance
from state parties in the cases of pirate masterminds with inevitably implicate the
traditional political problems of extraditing persons in positions of power.
The aforementioned issues regarding the surrender and extradition of those
involved in the on-shore operations of pirate networks are intricate and complex.
Prospective solutions for prosecuting land-based pirates most likely fall outside the scope
of problems that can be addressed by statutory provisions governing surrender and legal
assistance. One concern is evidentiary. The banking system in Somalia, hawala, is

47

Additionally, these pirates on the high seas only take about 30% of the ransom money, whereas the rest
goes to the leaders that are organizing the crimes. Robert Young Pelton, "Sea Dog Millionaires,"
Bloomberg Businessweek, May 16th, 2011.
Approximately 10% of the ransom money is distributed to the local community and politicians. Id
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premised on verbal banking transactions that are accompanied by the trust and honor of
the banker. As such, there is little to no paper trail tracing the ransom money once it
enters Somalia. The money is distributed to those involved and amongst the community;
it vanishes without a trace. 48 If the court’s focus also included the prosecution of the
financial organizers of piracy, there would need to be a legal structure for the transfer of
evidence that potentially reaches beyond the network of state parties to potentially nonagreeing states holding funds and financial statements stemming from piracy operations.
Additionally, there would need to be a firm legal basis for the organizational crimes
surrounding piracy, as these probably do not fall within the accepted definition of the
universal crime of piracy as armed robbery at sea.
IV.

CONCLUSION
As set forth in this memorandum, we believe that International Piracy Courts

surrender and legal assistance regime should be premised on the principle of
complementarity introduced by the ICC. Accordingly, the IPC specific provisions
governing cooperation from state parties should be modeled loosely on those of the ICC.
The statutory provisions should be particularly focused on a state’s duty to arrest and
assist with prosecution of suspected pirates as well as fostering international cooperation
between national courts and the IPC. However, while the statutes and rules of existing
international criminal tribunals provide a solid foundation for the drafting of a legal
assistance regime, many unresolved issues remain due to the complexity of modern
piracy operations and the sophistication of their criminal actors.

48

Mary Harper, Chasing the Somali Piracy Money Trail, BBC News May 24th, 2009.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/8061535.stm (accessed 7/14/11)
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